Writing

“What is happening to the world’s most powerful maritime force? In short, the U.S. Navy has consistently eroded the training of its own sailors, leaving their skills and knowledge to atrophy to a critical low in a single generation.”

“Sailors are ultimately trained to do a job, namely to fight the nation’s wars. To do that, they must think beyond rules on a page. They must know how to handle an F-18 in a dogfight, how to navigate their ship under EMCON, or how to patch radio circuits and fix a gas turbine when everything around them is on fire.”

Know your job. That was the first leadership lesson I learned when I reported to my first ship as a surface warfare officer (SWO) in training.”

Unlike nearly all other international navies, the engineering plants aboard US Navy ships are not managed by trained engineers, but by SWOs. Thibaut urges the Navy to create an engineering officer corps in the Surface Navy separate from the SWO community.

“There is nothing wrong with a captain giving his officers a good chewing out every now and then, if they deserve it, but it was hard to find respect for a leader who seemed to only see the worst in others and who blamed everything that went wrong on the people around him and never on himself.”

Through his own experience, Thibaut tackles the culture of toxic leadership in the Surface Navy and how it impacts sailors.

“To show up to one’s unit high or drunk should be considered a serious offense, but to have one positive THC test doesn’t make a service member an irredeemable criminal. Instead of turning their backs on these men and women, perhaps military leaders should seek to rehabilitate them.”

Thibaut highlights the inconsistency of the military’s stance on marijuana compared to alcohol use. Instead of a “zero tolerance” policy, the military should seek to counsel service members who test positive for THC and give them a second chance.

“Recent incidents in the surface navy have made clear the need for formal, standardized training for SWOs. A haphazard approach that asks junior officers random questions while seated at wardroom tables is no way to qualify anyone to stand watch on the bridge or in the engineering plant.”

Boards are a mainstay in shipboard culture and the primary means by which sailors are qualified for advanced watch stations. Unfortunately they are failing our sailors—here is how to change that.

“Nearly 12 years after commissioning the first littoral combat ship, the Navy has learned hard lessons about creating a new small surface combatant.”

As the Navy constructs a new class of frigates, it should learn from the lessons of the disastrous LCS program. As a former LCS navigator, Thibaut explains how.

“It’s not natural for human beings to live on ships, after all, and no amount of modern comfort can make going out to sea for that long not fundamentally suck.”

Thibaut shares the true story of bringing a suicidal sailor to shore while on deployment in the eastern Mediterranean, and explores what it means to “pull the crazy card” among a ship’s crew.

Officers, when they take the watch on the bridge of a warship, assume responsibility for the lives of every sailor onboard. At the very least, Navy leaders owe it to those sailors to do better.”

Thibaut explores the Navy’s response to two of the most tragic accidents in recent military history, and finds that it was sorely lacking. He pinpoints the real culprit, the Navy’s declining training standards, and offers a sweeping solution.

Media

Checking back in with Phil Briggs on his CBS Audio podcast Eye on Veterans to discuss The Wardroom.

Thibaut discusses his new book The Wardroom and the problems facing the US Navy today on this military-focused podcast.

Thibaut gives his insight on the military’s drug policy on the CBS Audio podcast Eye on Veterans.

Thibaut discusses his article Lessons for the Navy’s New Frigate from the Littoral Combat Ship on the Government Matters show.